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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICA
TION-WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC

REGENERATES

AN

Westinghouse Electnc Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
7th Cir 1978), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).

OLD

IDEA

580 F.2d 1311

Nowhere tS Shakespeare s observation that 'there tS nothtng et
ther good or bad but thtnkmg makes it so, more apt than tn the
realm of ethtcal constderations. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The success of an attorney-client relatIonshIp often depends
upon the mamtenance of confidentIality and loyalty between the
partIes. To ensure that confidentIality and loyalty are mamtamed,
professIOnal codes of responsibility as enforced by the courts re
qUIre attorneys to be disqualified from cases m whICh the confi
dences and secrets of a client may not be preserved, or from cases
m whICh there may be a conflict of mterest. One way m whICh the
courts have enforced thIS rule IS by holding that a client's confi
dences and secrets are Imputed to all members of a firm. Under
the ImputatIon doctnne,2 once a client retams a lawyer m a firm,
all lawyers m that firm are disqualified from representmg another
client whose mterests would conflict with those of the partICIpatmg
attorney s client.
Although thIS rule has its VIrtues, it can be cumbersome and
mequitable to large, multIcity firms whICh represent many different
1. ErnIe Indus., Inc.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. For diSCUSSIOn of the Imputation doctnne, see Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind.,
Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Amencan Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d
1125 (5th Cir. 1971); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 435 F Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y.), rev d In part, afI'd In part, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.
1977); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F Supp. 581
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), afI'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook
Co., 201 F Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1962); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 169 (1937); Id. No. 49 (1931); Id. No. 33 (1931); Id. No. 16 (1929);
ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINION
No. 1336 (1975); Id. No. 906 (1966); Kaplan, ForbIdden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U.L.
REV 914, 926 (1956); Kaufman, The -Former Government Attorney and the Canons
of Professional EthICS, 70 HARV L. REV 657, 660 (1957); Perkms, The New Federal
Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV L. REv 1113, 1161 (1963).
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clients. The opportunitIes for disqualificatIon due to a conflict of m
terest are likely to be greater m a large firm where many lawyers
represent a number of different clients. The rule can be partIcu
larly harsh considenng that attorneys m some large law firms have
little or no contact with one another and, therefore, are not m the
positIon to disclose theIr clients confidences and secrets.
A recent senes of declSlons does not accept the prmciple of
automatIc ImputatIon of knowledge to all members of the firm.
These cases determme whether the attorney should be disqualified
by evaluatmg hIS actual exposure to the confidences and secrets of
a client, rather than the mere possibility of hIS exposure to such
confidences and secrets. 3 ThIS pragmatIc approach makes access to
large firms more readily available to the mdividual client because
fewer firms will be automatIcally disqualified. These decIsIons
should benefit the large, multIcity firms.
Notwithstanding these mmority VIew declSlons, the majority
VIew of Imputmg knowledge to all members of a firm was recently
reaffirmed m Westmghouse Electnc Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp 4
The court m Westinghouse addressed the ethICal conSIderatIons m
volved m disqualifymg Kirkland & Ellis 5 (Kirkland), a large, multI
city firm. The firm s ChICago office had been retamed by Westmg
house. Unknown to that office, the mterests of Westmghouse were
adverse to those of another client who had prevIOusly retamed the
firm s Washmgton branch. Subsequently the client of the Washmg
ton branch sought to disqualify the ChICago office from represent
mg Westmghouse. Although the two offices had not exchanged the
confidences and secrets of either respectIve client, the court relied
on the traditIonal, mechamstIc, ImputatIon approach. The court auto
matIcaly Imputed the confidences and secrets of one client to all
members of the firm and disqualified any member of the firm from
representIng the other client. The court reasoned that the secrets
and confidences of the first client mIght be revealed m the repre
sentatIon of the new client.
3. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratonum NS
Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 201
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642 (7th Cir. 1979) (Fauchild, C.]., dissenting); Akerly
Red Barn
Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1977); Gas-A-Tron of Anz. v. Umon Oil Co. of Cal.,
534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1976); City of Cleveland Cleveland Elec. Illummating Co.,
440 F Supp. 193 (N.D. OhlO 1977), a/I'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
a/I'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); United States Standard Oil Co., 136 F Supp.
345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
4. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. demed, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
5. 2 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY, 385 B (1979).
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The declSlon m Westmghouse reaffirmed the established pre
cedent m the Seventh Circuit. 6 It rejected the mmority VIew es
poused m recent cases whICh reqUIred a thorough analysIs of the
facts m each case. ThIs note will examme the Westmghouse decI
SIon 7 m light of the underlymg objectIves of the ABA Code of Pro
fessIOnal Responsibility and the cases that have mterpreted the
Code s applicatIon m the area of disqualificatIon. It seeks to resolve
the tenSIOn between a stnct ImputatIon approach and the develop
ment of multIcity firms by establishmg procedural gUIdelines for
firms. These procedures will mamtam confidentIality and loyalty
between the partIes while provIding clients with mcreased mdivId
ual access to the legal counsel of theIr chOIce.
II.

FACTS

Kirkland, a large multICity firm with offices m Washmgton,
D C. and ChICago, IllinOIS, was retamed by the Amencan Petro
leum Institute (API).8 Gulf Oil Corp. (Gulf), Kerr-McGee Corp.
(Kerr-McGee), and Getty Oil Corp. (Getty) are substantIal dues
paymg members of API. Kirkland's Washmgton office was
prepanng arguments for API for upcommg divestiture heanngs 9 that
would oppose the adoptIon of legIslatIon mtended to break up the
oil compames. The legal servICes rendered to API reqUIred
Kirkland to research factual and legal questIons m thIS complex
area of corporate mterrelations. 1o To facilitate the representatIon, a
6. Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976).
7. The portions of the distr1ct court and Clrcuit dec1s1ons concermng the motion
by Noranda Mines Ltd. to disqualify Kirkland are not withm the scope of th1S article.
8. API 1S national petroleum trade assoc1ation whlCh performs w1de vanety
of cooperative efforts for the petroleum mdusty.
9. In October, 1975 leg1slative proposals were presented m Congress to break
up the oil compames, both vertically (by separating theH control over production,
transportation, refinmg, and marketing entities), and hOrizontally (by prohibiting
cross-ownersh1p of alternative energy sources m addition to oil and gas). 580 F.2d at
1313. Kirkland was retamed by committee formed to lobby agamst these proposals.
Id
10. A letter dated May 4, 1976 stated that the Kirkland firm work for API
should mclude the preparation of possible testimony, analyzmg the probable legal
consequences and antitrust cons1derations of the proposed leg1slation [and] should
make an objective survey and study of the probable effects of the pending leg1sla
tion, specifically mcluding probable effects on the oil compames that would have to
divest assets.
Id. The letter specified that Kirkland was to, act as an mdepen
dent expert counsel and hold any company mformation learned through these mter
V1ews m str1Ct confidence, not to be disclosed to any other company, or even to API,
except m aggregated or such other form as will preclude 1dentifymg the source com
pany with its data. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F Supp. 1284,

130

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:127

partner at Kirkland's Washmgton office mterviewed representatives
of eIght oil compames and confidentially surveyed fifty-mne mem
bers of API. 11
While the Washmgton office was representmg the member oil
compames of API, Kirkland's ChIcago branch was prepanng a case
agamst the oil compames. The ChICago branch brought an antitrust
action m behalf of Westmghouse Electnc COrp.12 agamst twelve
foreIgn and seventeen domestic corporations engaged m vanous as
pects of the uranIUm mdustry 13 The suit agamst the oil compames
alleged that startmg m 1972 a cartel agreement [was arranged] to
ng bIds, fix pnces and contract terms. "14 They had apparently
agreed to "diVIde and allocate the world uramum market among
the uramum producers, [whICh would] reqUire Westmghouse and
other uramum resellers to pay discnmmatorily hIgh pnces. "15 Ac
cording to the complamt, an agreement had been reached between
the foreIgn producers and the producers of uramum m the United
States. The agreement was desIgned to raIse and stabilize world
pnces, "to withdraw uramum from the market, to boycott West
mghouse, to lobby foreIgn offiCIals to refuse to sell uramum to
Westmghouse, and to exchange market mformatIon.
"16
Westmghouse sought a declaration that thIS conduct VIOlated Sec
tion 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff
ACt. 17 The complamt also requested treble damages and mJunctive
relief. 18
1291-92 (N.D Ill.), afl'd In part, rev d and remanded In part, sub nom. 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. demed, 439 U.S. 955 (1979).
11. Accompanymg the survey questionnrure was cover letter written by API'
General Counsel. The letter stated m part:
Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe IS acting as an mdependent special counsel for
API, and will hold any company mformation m Strict confidence, not to be
disclosed to any other company, or even API, except m aggregated or such
other form as will preclude mdentifymg the source company with its data.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F Supp. 1284, 1293 (N.D. Ill.),
a!f'd In part, rev d and remanded In part, sub nom. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th CiT. 1978),
cert. demed, 439 U.S. 955 (1979) (emphasIs m ongmal).
12. The Chicago office had represented Westinghouse for many years. ld. at
1289.
13. On September 8, 1975, Westinghouse, major manufacturer of nuclear reac
tors, notified utility compames that 17 of its long term uramum supply contracts had
become commerCially Impracticable under § 2-615 of the Uniform CommerCial
Code. In response, the affected utilities filed suit agrunst Westinghouse. The devel
opment of Westinghouse defense led to the antitrust action. ld. at 1288.
14. ld.
15. ld.
16. ld.
17. ld.
18. ld.

1979)

ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION

131

A companson of the API report and the complaInt filed for
WestInghouse Indicates a basIc conflict In the representations made
by the firm s two offices. The final report 19 to API was released on
October 15, 1976. The report's analYSIS, based on a thorough reVIew
of the Information supplied by the oil compames, stated that the
current diversification of the oil compames did not threaten overall
energy competition. It concluded that the proposed legtslatIon was
not reqUired. On the same day Kirkland's ChIcago office filed
WestInghouse s complamt, chargmg the oil compames with con
spIracy to destroy competition m the uramum market and to artifi
CIally mcrease pnces. The oil compames charged that Kirkland had
taken opposmg positions on the same Issue. Kirkland's failure to re
but thIS charge was Interpreted by the court as Kirkland's
acknowledgement of its contradictory positions. 20
The oil compames sought Kirkland's disqualification from rep
resentmg Westmghouse because the firm s WashIngton office had
represented API. They claImed that mformatIon shared by the oil
compames with the firm, and theIr reliance on the promIse of stnct
confidentiality established an attorney-client relationshIp. They
claImed that allowmg the dual representation of the substantially
related and conflictIng mterests VIolated Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the
ABA Code of ProfeSSIOnal Responsibility 21
Kirkland strongly demed that there was any baSIS for disquali
fyIng the ChICago office as counsel for WestInghouse. Kirkland ar
gued that Kerr-McGee, Getty and Gulf failed to establish the cru
CIal element of a disqualification motion, that an attorney-client
relationshIp eXIsted between the partIes. Although Kirkland agreed
that it had a profeSSIOnal relationshIp with Westmghouse and API,
the firm maIntaIned that thIS profeSSIOnal relationshIp did not ex
tend to the mdividual members of API. Kirkland produced eVI
dence substantiatIng its position that it had not acted as attorney
for the oil compames. 22 Kirkland further contended that the re
search performed for the API report did not produce any signifi
19. The complete report, representing all aspects of the diversification ques
tion, covered 230 pages of text and 82 pages of exhibits. UranIum, the subject matter
of the Westinghouse suit, IS the pnmary subject of approXimately 25 pages of text
and II pages of exhibits. 580 F.2d at 1314.
20. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F Supp. 1284,1294 (N.D.
Ill.), affd m part, rev d and remanded m part, sub nom. 580 F.2d 13II (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1979).
21. See text accompanymg notes 49-58 mfra.
22. Kirkland emphaSized requests for data m the uranIum contracts litigation m
the name of Westinghouse, contemporaneous written communIcations, and course of
dealing with the oil companIes.
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cant confidential mformatIon that had been or was to be used
agamst the oil compames m the Westmghouse suit.
Kirkland also argued that the firm s Washmgton attorneys kept
theu work confidential from the firm s ChICago attorneys, and VIce
versa. 23 The Westmghouse antitrust suit was disclosed only to
those directly mvolved m the matter Securihes law dictated that
public disclosure of possible antitrust lawsuits be prevented. 24
None of the Washmgton attorneys workmg on the API report knew
of the separate Westmghouse antitrust complamt until it was filed
m court. Similarly the ChICago attorneys were Isolated from the
work bemg done by the Washmgton office and had little, if any
awareness of the API proJect. 25 Kirkland's thud argument was that
the actual hardshIp and mconvemence Westmghouse would expen
ence by disqualificatIon far outweIghed the actual or apparent preJ
udice to the oil companIes. 26
The oil compames first attempt at disqualificaton was rejected.
In Westmghouse Electnc Corp. v. Rw Algom Ltd.,27 the distnct
court upheld Kirkland's representation. The lower court found that
no attorney-client relatIOnshIp eXIsted between Kirkland and the oil
compames. 28 That conclusIOn mooted the clrums under Canons 4
23. There was one partial overlap between the Chicago and Washmgton attor
neys m connection with the API antidivestiture representation. One of Kirkland'
lead attorneys workmg on the Westinghouse antitrust complamt prepared
legal
memorandum for API. The memorandum exammed arguments broadenmg the scope
of eXisting antitrust laws proscribmg mterlockmg directorates. After an analYSIS of
the facts, the district court concluded that "[tlhe memorandum addresses the anti
trust Issues from predommantly theoretical perspective, and does not contam one
word on uranIum. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F Supp. 1284,
1296 (N.D. IlL), aiI'd In part, rev d and remanded In part, sub nom. 580 F.2d 1311
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1979). With thiS analYSIS, the overlap did
not have any Impact on the district court' determmation.
24. ld.
25. ld.
26. One factor that weighed heavily m the distrlCt court' determmation of the
case was the magnitude and complexity of the representation. The litigation had to
that pomt reqUIred the efforts of from eight to 14 attorneys for Westinghouse and had
generated some $2.5 million m legal fees. ld. at 1289. Further eVidence of the com
plexity of the litigation IS apparent from Judge Marshall' deCISIOn to delay the tnal
date by one year, to September 1981. A spokesman for Westinghouse stated that the
Judge was afraid people Just weren't gomg to be ready m time. Wall Street Jour
nal, Aug. 31, 1979, at 10, col. 4. Most recent figures mdicate that seven million pages
of documents had been submitted dunng the discovery proceedings. ld. Both Sides
are expected to take more than three hundred depositions. ld.
27. 448 F Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill.), aiI'd In part, rev d and remanded In part,
sub nom. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1979).
28. ld. at 1303. The court reasoned that where there IS no express or Implied
agreement between the attorney and the layman, the attorney-client relationship
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and 529 of the ABA Code of ProfessIOnal Responsibility whIch are
applicable only m an attorney-client relatIonshIp.30 The court did,
however, hold that the ethIcal consIderatIons embodied m Canon 9
were applicable to an attorney even if no professIOnal relatIonshIp
eXIsted. 31 Although the court recognIZed the senous ethIcal ques
tIons that KIrkland's actIons posed, it held that those actIons were
msufficient to warrant the extreme step of disqualificatIon, particu
larly m a case of thIS complexity 32 The court also ruled that public
policy weIghed agaInst disqualifYmg the firm. The court stated that
forcmg Kirkland to gIve up the case to another firm would mevita
bly delay the progress of the litIgatIOn and mIght compromIse the
Just resolutIon of the vital public Issue bemg litIgated. 33
The cIrcuit court reversed the distnct court's deCISIOn. The
court's consIderatIon of the threshold questIon of the attorney
client relatIonshIp rejected the agency analysIs relied on by the
lower court. 34 The court reasoned that where there IS a fidUCIary
duty between a layman and an attorney the attorney IS bound by
the ABA Code of ProfeSSIOnal Responsibility m that relatIonshIp.
To promote the goals and pnnciples of the Code, the court applied
the JudiCIally created mechamstIc, ImputatIon approach. The court
Imputed the matenal mformatIon gaIned from the research for API
by the Washmgton office to the ChIcago branch. With that knowl
edge Imputed, there was a possibility of breachmg the client's con
fidences and secrets, and Kirkland was disqualified. The court re
Jected the argument that the actual separatIon of the two offices or
the mtentIonal separatIon of the two staffs was suffiCIent to aVOId
negatIve ethIcal mferences generated from consIderatIon of the
Code. The deCISIOn refused to recognIZe any distInctIon between
actual or apparent exposure to the confidences and secrets of a
client.
could be established only through examInation of the relationship In light of agency
law After undertakIng an exhaustive analYSIS of the relationship between Kirkland
and the oil compames, the court concluded that an attorney-client relationship did
not eXist between the parties. Id.
29. See text accompanYIng notes 49-58 mfra.
30. 448 F Supp. at 1300 (citing Fred Weber, Inc.
Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d
602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Yam ProcessIng Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d
83, 90 (5th Cir. 1976); Amencan Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129
(5th Cir. 1971)).
31. 448 F Supp. at 1304.
32. ld.
33. Id. at 1306.
34. See note 23 supra.
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THE CODIFICATION OF ETHICS IN THE UNITED STATES

To determme when the mechamstIc ImputatIon of knowledge
to all members of a firm IS approprIate, it IS necessary to under
stand the hlstoncal development and the ratIonale behmd the
codified ethics applicable to the legal professIOn m ~he United
States. The AmerIcan Bar AssociatIon s (ABA) concern for mam
tammg mmlmum professional standards among attorneys35 resulted
m the adoptIon of the Canons of ProfessIOnal Ethics m 1908 (the
former Canons).36 The Bar recognIZed that such provIsions could
help to mamtam respect for the legal professIOn and its place m
AmerIcan JUrIsprudence. 37 The fonner Canons were mtended to
aId law students and practIcmg lawyers m remaInmg loyal to the
ethical precepts of the legal professIOn.
One major concern reflected m the former Canons was the at
torney S obligatIon of confidentIality 38 ThiS obligatIon IS mtended
to facilitate the attorney s ability to represent his client effectIvely
The pledge of confidentIality encourages the client to share with
his lawyer all pertment factual mformatIon whICh IS essentIal to ef
fectIve representatIon. ConfidentIality may also encourage laymen
to seek legal assistance. 39
The prInciple of confidentIality was eVident m three of the
35. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 25 (1953).
36. Canons 1 through 32 were adopted by the ABA at its 31st Annual Meeting
on August 27, 1908. Canons 33 through 45 were adopted at the 51st Annual Meeting
on July 26, 1928. Canon 46 was adopted on August 31, 1933. Canon 47 was adopted
September 30, 1937. In the perIod from 1928 until the adoption of the new Code m
1970, VarIOUS canons were subjected to amendment and revIsion. See notes 46-58
and accompanymg text anfra.
37. The members of the bar foresaw that the consequent weakemng of an ef
fective professIOnal public opmlOn clearly called for more definite statement by the
bar of the accepted rules of profeSSIOnal conduct. See note 35 supra at 25.
38. The concept has been
part of Anglo-AmerIcan JUrIsprudence smce the
reign of Elizabeth I, makmg it the oldest of the eVidentiary pnvileges. For an histor
ICal treatment of the eVidentiary pnvilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2290, at
542 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
39. The lawyer client prIvilege (agamst disclosure of confidences) IS one
of the oldest and most Ironclad m the law. It IS also one of the most sensible
rules of ethiCS. The lawyer IS often the possessor of guilty secrets. The client
has done somethmg wrong; he bares hiS soul to the attorney (or the attorney
drags the facts out). If the lawyer were duty bound to reveal statements hiS
client has commumcated to him m pnvate, the lawyer would be mcapable
of zealous representation.
J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 140 (1978); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE
SPONSIBILITY, EthICal Consideration 4-1 [heremafter cited as ECl. See also note 35
supra at 131-37
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former Canons. Former Canon 640 stated that the attorney s obliga
tion of confidentiality barred hIm from subsequently acceptmg em
ployment from other clients if it would adversely affect confidences
reposed m the attorney by a pnor client. Former Canon 1141
stated that the attorney should aVOid takmg advantage of client
confidences for personal benefit. Former Canon 3742 mstructed the
attorney about preservmg the confidences of clients. It stated that
the duty contmued after the termmatIon of the lawyer s employ
ment by hIs client and extended to an attorney s employees. Em
40.

Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests:
It IS the duty of lawyer at the time of retamer to disclose to the client
all the cIrcumstances of hIS relations to the parties, and any mterest m or
connection with the controversy, whICh mIght mfluence the client m the se
lection of counsel.
It IS unprofessIOnal to represent conflicting mterests, except by express
consent of all concerned gIven after full disclosure of the facts. Withm the
meanmg of thIS canon, lawyer represents conflicting mterests when, m be
half of one client, it IS hIS duty to contend for that whICh duty to another cli
ent reqUIres hIm to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undiVIded fidelity and not to
divulge hIS secrets or confidences forbIds also the subsequent acceptance of
retamers or employment from others m matters adversely affecting any mter
est of the client with respect to whIch confidence has been reposed.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIDCS, No.6.
41. Dealing with Trust Property.
The lawyer should refram from any action whereby for hIS personal
benefit or gam he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed m
hIm by hIS client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property
commg mto the posseSSIOn of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
for promptly, and should not under any cIrcumstances be commmgled with
hIS own or be used by hIm.
1d. No. 11.
42. Confidences of Client.
It IS the duty of lawyer to preserve hIS client' confidences. ThIS duty
outlasts the lawyer employment, and extends as well to hIS employees; and
neither of them should accept employment whIch mvolves or may mvolve
the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the pnvate advantage
of the lawyer or hIS employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without
hIS knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available
sources of such mformation. A lawyer should not continue employment
when he discovers that thIS obligation prevents the performance of hIS full
duty to hIS former or to hIS new client.
If lawyer IS accused by hIS client, he IS not precluded from disclosmg
the truth m respect to the accusation. The announced mtention of client to
commit cnme IS not mcluded withm the confidences whICh he IS bound to
respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to pre
vent the act or protect those agamst whom it IS threatened.
1d. No. 37.
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ployment whlCh mIght mvolve the disclosure or use of the confi
dences either for the prIvate advantage of the lawyer or hIs
employees, or to the disadvantage of the client without the client's
permIssIon, must be declined. Employment should be discontm
ued when an attorney discovers that he may not be able to perform
hIS duty fully to hIS former or hIS new client.
The second general area of ethlCal consIderatIons m the former
Canons whlCh IS relevant to disqualificatIon IS the concern for con
flicts of mterest m the lawyer S dealings with past or present cli
ents. The duty owed to the client IS based on the strong fidUCIary
nature of the relatIOnshIp. The attorney actmg prImarily for the
benefit of hIS client, becomes a source of confidences and secrets.
The fidUCIary duty places a specIal burden upon the attorney m hIS
dealings with other clients to protect those confidences and secrets.
ThIS duty arIses whenever the mterests of the first client are, or
could be, endangered. 43 The concern for the conflicts of mterest
problem IS reflected m former Canons 644 and 37 45
The ABA Canons of ProfessIOnal EthICS did not specifically de
fine what constituted an ethIcal VIOlatIon. While the Canons were
mtended to mspIre lawyers to follow certam ethICal gUIdelines,
they were not mandatory and did not set forth sanctIons. As part of
the contmued effort to update the Canons and mcrease theIr value
and applicability a SpeCIal Committee on EvaluatIon of EthIcal
Standards was established by the ABA. The committee produced
the new ABA Code of ProfessIOnal Responsibility whICh became
effectIve on January 1, 1970. 46 The goal of the present Code IS to
retam the sound pnnciples of the fonner Canons and to form the
foundabon for clear mstrucbon to the begmnmg practitioner. The
43. See note 35 supra at 89-189.
44. See note 40 supra and accompanymg text.
45. See note 42 supra and accompanymg text.
46. Unlike the fonner Canons, the new Code IS diVided mto nIne general can
ons, each of whICh contams Ethical Considerations and DiSCiplinary Rules. The Can
ons are statements m general tenns of the standards of profeSSional conduct. PrelimI
nary Statement to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. The Ethical
Considerations suggest goals whICh members of the professIOn should strive to at
tam. Id. The essential difference m the new Code IS the DiSCiplinary Rules whICh
are mandatory m character. Id. They state the minImal level of conduct" beyond
whICh profeSSIOnal behaVIOr will not be tolerated without the mitiation of diSCiplin
ary action. Id.
The Code m its present fonn IS deSigned to be adopted by the approprIate
agencies. Id. State bar associations that have adopted the Code are free to make
changes m theIr verSIOn. Interested attorneys should check the fonn of the Code ap
plicable to theIr JUrIsdiction.
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new Code IS mtended as a gUlde for conduct and as the basIs for
discIplinary actIon. 47
Canon 4 states: A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences
and Secrets of a Client. "48 ThIS Canon, with its EthICal ConSIdera
tIons (EC) and DiscIplinary Rules (DR), makes no changes m the
settled pnncipies of ethICS prevIously developed m thIS area, al
though they do add specificity Canon 4 recodifies the traditIonal
Ideas encompassed by former Canons 6, 11, and 37 49 These Ideas
were further strengthened through numerous ABA formal opmIOns
and mformal opmIOns Issued smce 1926. 50
Canon 5 states: A Lawyer Should ExerCIse Independent Pro
feSSIOnal Judgment on Behalf of a Client."51 It IS largely concerned
with the effect of dual representatIon upon the quality of the pro
feSSIOnal servIce rendered to a client. 52 The Canon IS based on the
anCIent maxIm that one man cannot serve two masters. 53 A com
panson with the former Canons54 mdicates little substantIve
change m the reasonmg behmd disqualificatIon for pnor represen
tatIon or representatIon of clients with conflictmg mterests. 55 DIS
cIplinary Rule 5-101(A) best restates the central concept behmd the
conflict of mterest area, reassertIng the smgle-mInded fidelity with
whIch the lawyer must devote hImself to the mterests of hIS cli
ent.56 The Canon also takes the positIon that when an attorney IS
prevented from acceptmg employment under a DiSCIplinary Rule,
the members of hIS firm are also prohibited from acceptIng that
employment. 57 The ratIonale, denved from exammatIOn of the
overnding DiSCIplinary Rule, IS to aVOId a situatIon m whICh the
See R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 3-9 (2d ed. 1970).
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4.
49. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 47 supra at 65.
51. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5.
52. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DiSCiplinary Rule
5-105, Ethical Considerations 5-14 & 5-15.
53. "No man can serve two masters; for he will hate the one, and love the
other; or else he will hold to one, and despise the other. He cannot serve God and
mammon. Matthew 6:24. See also ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINION
No. 33 (1931); ld. No. 71 (1932); ld. No. 83 (1932).
54. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Nos. 6, 11, & 37.
55. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
56. "Except with the consent of hiS client after full disclosure, lawyer shall
not accept employment if the exercise of hiS profeSSIOnal Judgement on behalf of hiS
client will be or reasonably may be affected by hiS own finanCial, bUSiness, property,
or personal Interests. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DiSCiplinary
Rule 5-101(A).
57 ld. at 5-101 (D).
47.
48.
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mterests of one client may ImpaIr the mdependent profeSSIOnal
Judgment of the attorney representmg another client. The concern
of the courts with attorneys mvolved m conflict of mterest situa
tIons IS reflected m the mcreasmg number of cases m whIch diSCI
plinary actIon has been taken, mcluding disqualificatIon, censure,
disbarment, and refusal to enforce fee agreements. 58
Canons 4 and 5 represent recodmcatIons of EthICal ConsIdera
tIons found m the former code. Canon 9' s command to aVOid even
the appearance of Impropnety adds a concept contamed nowhere
m the former Canons. The EthICal ConsIderatIons and DIscIplinary
Rules followmg the Canon provIde some examples of possible VIO
latIOns. PractitIoners should recogmze, however that Canon 9 IS
applicable to all aspects of a professIOnal relatIonshIp, Under a lit
eral mterpretatIon of the language to "AVOId Even the Appearance
of ProfeSSIOnal Impropnety "59 Canon 9 would tngger diSCIplinary
actIon for a broader scope of actIvitIes than those covered by Can
ons 4 and 5.
IV

DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CODIFIED
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

To establish workable gUIdelines for the disqualificatIon of
counsel and to achIeve the goals of the EthICal ConSIderatIons, the
courts have developed a bifurcated approach. The party makmg the
motIon for disqualificatIon must first establish that an attorney
client relatIonshIp has eXIsted or does eXIst. The movmg party must
then prove that there IS a substantIal relatIonshIp between the sub
Ject matter of the two representatIons. The substantIal relatIonshIp
element reqUIres the movmg party to show that the subject matter
of the mitIal relatIonshIp IS suffiCIently related60 to the representa
tIon upon whIch disqualificatIon IS sought. 61 It IS only when. there
58. See Kindregan, Conflict of Interest and the Lawyer In Civil Practice, 10
VAL. U.L. REV 423 (1976).
59. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9.
60.
I hold that the fonner client need show no more than that the mat
ters embraced withm the pending suit
are substantially related to the
matters or cause of action wherem the attorney preVIOusly represented him,
the fonner client. The Court will assume that dunng the course of the
former representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney beanng on
the subject matter of the representation.
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
61. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978);
In re Yam Processmg Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Redd
Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975); ErnIe Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
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IS a representatIon mvolvmg related matenal that the possibility of
a breach of the client's secrets and confidences may occur
ThIs two-part test for determmmg the disqualificatIon of an at
torney was deSIgned to meet several conSIderatIons. The attorney
client relatIonshIp element has been developed because the rule of
confidentIality should not necessarily cover all commumcatIon be
tween the attorney and client. ThIS IS a lOgIcal corollary to the un
derlymg purpose of encouragmg the client to discuss hIS legal
problems openly with hIS attorney The protectIon of con
fidentIality IS granted only to the client. 62 The reqUIrement that
the two representatIons be substantIally related63 IS mtended to
protect the client's commumcatIons with the attorney without un
duly restnctmg the attorney s nght to practIce law freely The
screemng of cases through these two tests IS deSIgned to aVOId
placmg the attorney m the dilemma of havmg to make a good faith
judgment, subject to JudiCIal reVIew as to whether or not to accept
a new client. 64
The baSIC test for disqualifymg an attorney IS that there be an
attorney-client relatIonshIp and that the subject matter of the rep
resentatIons be substantIally related. ThIS test has been modified

478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); Amencan Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125
(5th Cir. 1971); Chugach Elec. Ass n
United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th
Cir. 1966), cere. demed, 389 U.S. 820 (1967); Cannon v. United States Acoustics
Corp., 398 F Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), modified, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976);
Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Estates
Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
62. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); In re
Yarn Processmg Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83,90 (5th Cir. 1976); Amencan
Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971); T.C. Theatre Corp.
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
63. "Unfortunately, the cases furnish no applicable gUide as to what creates
substantial relationship.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F Supp. 345, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
64. Even the most ngorous self-diSCipline might not prevent lawyer from
unconSCIOusly usmg or mampulating confidence acqUired m the earlier
representation and transformmg it mto a telling advantage m the subsequent
litigation. Or, out of an excess of good faith, lawyer might bend too far m
the opposite direction, reframmg from selzmg legitimate opportunity for
fear that such tactic might give nse to an appearance of Impropnety In
neither event would the litigant' or the public mterest be well served
These conSiderations reqUire application of Strict prophylactic rule to pre
vent any possibility, however slight, that confidential mformation acqUired
from
client durmg prevIOus relationship may subsequently be used to
the client' disadvantage.
ErnIe Indus., Inc.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
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and further developed. 65 Under the modified approach, the court
had to ascertam whether the complamant showed that the attorney
had physIcal access to substantIally related matenal. If the attorney
did have access, even though the mformatIon was not actually com
mUnIcated, an mference of commUnIcatIon would be made. The at
torney could offer no proof to rebut the mference if the proof
would disclose any of the confidences sought to be preserved. ThIs
modified approach was developed prIor to the adoptIon of the ABA
Code of ProfessIonal Responsibility and Canon g's command to
AVOld Even the Appearance of ProfeSSIOnal Impropnety "66
The rules pertammg to the disqualificatIon of an mdividual at
torney were deSIgned to uphold the applicable EthICal ConSIdera
tIons. In Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Brothers Circuit Man
agement Corp.,67 the court was faced, however, with an ethICal
questIon to whIch the Canons of ProfessIOnal EthICS had not yet
been applied. A motIon was made to disqualify an attorney and hIS
firm on the grounds that the attorney s preVIOUS employment ex
posed hIm to the confidences and secrets of a client who was an
adverse party m the present suit. 68 The Judge concluded that there
had been an attorney-client relatIonshIp and that the subject
matter of the two representatIons was substantIally related. The at
torney was, therefore, disqualified under the gmdelines of former
Canon 6. The court also decIded that the firm was properly
disqualified,69 but it did not explam the extenSIOn of Canon 6 to all
members of the firm.
The ImputatIon doctrIne was applied one year later m Laskey
Brothers of West Virgtnta v Warner Brothers Pictures 70 whICh lll
volved a situatIon SImilar to that m Consolidated Theatres The
court upheld the disqualificatIon of the entIre firm, statmg that all
members of a partnershIp are barred from partICIpatIon m a case
65. For more conCise history see Note, EthIcal ConsIderations When an At
Realistic Application of Canon
torney Opposes
Former Client: The Need for
Nine, Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975), 52
CHI.-KENT L. REV 525 (1975).
66. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9.
67. 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
68. While Consolidated Theatres represents the first Interpretation of Canon 6
on the disqualification question, it was not the first case to disqualify firm because
of past representation of one of the partners. See In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 63,
10 P 47 65 (1886) (dictum); Chnstian v. Waialua Agncultural Co., 30 Hawan 533
(1928). See also Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Ad
verse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 920 (1955).
69. 216 F.2d at 928.
70. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. dented, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
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when one partner has been disqualified. 71 The court said that its
conclusIOn was an extensIOn of the literal wording of former Canons
6 72 and 3773 The extensIon of the theory of disqualificatIon was
based on the premIse that the partner possessmg confidentIal mfor
matIon could enable other members of the firm to learn confi
dences and secrets of the client, even if the other partners had not
actually been exposed to the confidentIal mformatIon or had partIc
Ipated m the representatIon. The doctnne developed m Consoli
dated Theatres and Laskey Brothers m response to small, two
member partnershIps, has contmued to evolve. It IS now applied to
all members of a firm m a maJority74 of Junsdicbons. 75
The substantIal relatIonshIp test and the ImputatIon doctrme
were deVIsed by the courts to promote the policIes and ethIcs
embodied m the Canons of ProfessIOnal EthIcs. After the new
Code became effectIve m 1970, courts facmg the lawyer disqualifi
71. Id. at 826.
72. See note 40 supra.
73. See note 42 supra.
74. Contra, United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). Motion by the United States to disqualify the law finn of one of the defen
dants m
suit brought to recover excessive funds paid out due to alleged over
charges m crude oil sales. The alleged overcharges were financed through part of
'the Marshall Plan, known as the Economic Cooperation Admmlstration (ECA). Dis
qualification was sought on the grounds that member of the finn had at one time
been counsel for ECA Paris office.
The disqualification motion was argued on two grounds. The United States al
leged that the attorney mvolved had both obtamed confidential mfonnation from the
plaintiff and had, m the course of hiS employment with plaintiff, made deCISions rel
evant to the present case. Id. at 353. Defendants successfully argued that there was
no substantial relationship between these two positions because of diVISion of re
sponsibilities by the Washmgton, D.C. office of the ECA (where purchase and prIce
regulations were drafted, published and enforced) and the Paris office. Id. at 357.
The government's second argument stated that if any relevant mfonnation could
be Imputed to any attorney at the Pans office, it must then be Imputed to the attor
ney m question. Id. at 360. The court, conSiderIng the large, multinational govern
ment agency mvolved, refused to Impute the confidences and secrets m thiS case.
The court recognized distinction between cases mvolvmg hOrIzontal and vertical
Imputation. Where there IS vertical structure, the attorney IS charged with the knowl
edge of hiS JUnIors. For the hOrIzontal structure, however, the court requIred an anal
YSIS of the facts of the mdivldual case before Imputing that mfonnation. Here, the
court reasoned, the structure and functions of the offices made it unlikely that the at
torney m question received any mfonnation pertinent to the oil transactions. Id. at
362. Therefore, the court could not apply hOrIzontal Imputation of the relevant m
formation. Id. at 364. Even though limited to the case of an attorney m
large,
multinational government agency, the Standard Oil court reqUIred a pragmatic anal
ysis and based its deCISion on the facts of the case, and not on the automatic Imputa
tion of relevant mfonnation.
75. See note 2 supra.
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cation question had to consIder a new concept m legal ethIcs.
Canon 9 mandated that the attorney "Should AVOld Even the Ap
pearance of ProfessIOnal Impropnety "76
One of the first cases to recognlZe the distinctIOns mcorpo
rated m the new Code was Richardson v. Hamilton International
Corp 77 The court appeared to be applymg the substantial relation
ShIP test, but the court based its conclusIOn on the fact that there
was only "some relationshIp between the former representation
and the current litIgatIon. 78 The tnal Judge held that although it
was a close questIon, disqualificatIon was reqUIred to aVOId the ap
pearance of evil. "79 The court recogmzed that it was faced with
reachmg a result that was controlled by two contradictory rules.
First, the substantial relationshIp test reqUIred that the subject
matter of the two representatIons be closely related. Secondly
there was the "appearance of evil" test, whICh would function
whenever it appeared that there mIght be a conflict between the
partIes. 80 On final analysIs, however, the court m Richardson ap
plied the substantial relatIOnshIp test. The court held that disquali
ficatIon would be tnggered by a lower standard than was formerly
reqUIred. When there IS an appearance of evil, the court SIdes
with the client and disqualifies the lawyer The trend of declSlons
Immediately followmg thIS declSlon mcreased recognitIOn of the Im
pact of Canon 9 and mdicated that the courts were senous about
enforcmg a stnct mterpretatIon of the Canon, regardless of the
consequences. 81
As a result of the harsh consequences denved from a stnct m
terpretatIon of Canon 9, some courts recogmzed the need for a
more pragmatIc approach to the treatment of ImputatIOn. ThIS new
trend was established by the court m Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
76. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, Canon 9.
77 333 F Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afI'd, 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
dented, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (motion to disqualify attorney, who had preVIOusly per
fonned legal work for corporation, from bnngIng class action and shareholder
denvative suit agaInst that corporation).
78. ld. at 1054.
79. ld.
80. The tnal took place before the adoption of the new Code, and ostensibly
was based on old Canons 6 and 37. ld. The appeal was deCIded under the new
Code, however. ld. It has been concluded that the language and stress on appear
ances Indicates that the court recogmzed the mandate of the new Canon 9. See
Note. supra note 65, at 531 n.37
81. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); ErnIe Indus., Inc.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); Cannon v. United States Acoustics Corp.,
398 F Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.82 After exam1010g the functIon1Og of
a large law firm, the court concluded that it would be absurd to as
sume that all of the confidences and secrets of all the firm s clients
are reposed 10 all assocIates. The court stated: "[AJ ratIonal 10ter
pretatIon of the Code of ProfessIonal Responsibility does not call
for disqualificatIOn on the basIs of such an unrealistIc perception of
the practice of law 10 large firms. "83 The court dist10gUlshed its de
term1OatIon 10 Silver Chrysler from other recent disqualificatIon
cases. After surveY10g a number of cases reqUIrIng disqualificatIon,
the court concluded that the result was patently clear 10 those
partIcular cases because of the CIrcumstances 1Ovolved. 84 In Silver
Chrysler however the court refused the mechamstIc Imputation
that would have necessitated disqualificatIon of the entIre firm.
Courts have differed 10 theIr 1OterpretatIon of the ImputatIon
questIon, particularly 10 relatIon to cases concern1Og the govern
ment attorney 10 pnvate practice. ThIS diverse treatment prompted
the ABA Committee on EthIcs and ProfeSSIOnal Responsibility to
discuss the Issue. 85 The committee ultimately rejected a mech
amstIc application of Imputation. The Issue presented to the commit
tee 1Ovolved a former government attorney who subsequently prac
tIced 10 the pnvate sector DISCIplinary Rule 9-101(B) states that a
82. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975) (motion to disqualify attorney and law finn by
reason of attorney havmg once been assocIated with an eIghty man firm whIch repre
sented the adverse party m the present suit; the attorney level of mvolvement with
the finn was msufficlent to expose hIm to confidences that could be used m the cur
rent representation).
83. ld. at 754.
84. ld. Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney who had
worked m defense of the same case sought to Jom forces with the plamtiffs); General
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (attorney prevIously
servmg with the Department of Justice In Washmgton, sought to represent City of
New York In an antitrust suit for whICh he had had substantial responsibility while
In Washmgton); ErnIe Indus., Inc.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (at
torney first represented Burlington IndustrIes, Inc. as client and then represented
client sumg Burlington subSIdiary); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d
1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973) (attorney vested with substan
tial responsibility for defense of Hamilton m SEC suit not free to represent persons
sUIng Hamilton on related matter); Churgach Elec. Ass n v. United States Dist. Court,
370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966) (attorney who had been general counsel for Churgach
for several years could not appear as counsel m an antitrust action agamst Churgach);
Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (attorney for
plaIntiff had, In the course of hIS fonner servIce as Saab counsel, represented Saab
In SImilar suits).
85. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL
OPINION, No. 342 (1975). See also Note, Appearance of lmpropnety As the Sole
Ground For Disqualification, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV 1516 (1977).
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lawyer may not accept such employment if it concerns a matter m
whICh he had substantIal responsibility as a public employee.
While the opmIon analyzes DR9-101(B), it contams an mterpreta
tIon of Canon 9 that IS applicable to the disqualificatIon of an entIre
firm. The committee noted that the appearance of professIOnal Im
proprIety" IS not a standard, test, or element embodied m the dis
cIplinary rule. The placement of DR9-101(B) under Canon 9 repre
sents a policydeclSlon that the "appearance of professIonal
ImprOprIety" and attempts to aVOId that appearance, are orily part
of the underlymg theorIes for the rule. The opImon stated that the
appearance of evil IS probably not even the most Important reason
for the eXIstence of the rule. 86 Under the committee s approach, it
IS necessary to look past the appearance of ImproprIety and analyze
the ratIonale for the rule. The committee reasoned that the mter
pretatIon of the rule should be made consIstent, as far as possible,
with the underlymg policy consIderatIons. 87 Therefore, the mter
pretatIon of any rule reqUIres the evaluatIon of the policy consIder
atIons that underlie the creatIon of the rule.
The prInCIples of the committee s decIsIon were applied by the
court m Kesselhaut v. United States 88 In Kesselhaut, an actIon was
brought to recover counsel fees whICh the plamtiffs alleged were
owed because of theIr representatIon of the Federal Housmg Au
thority (FHA) m certam property matters. The government sought
to disqualify plamtiff's counsel because an mdivIdual assOCIated
with counsel for the plamtiff had been general counsel for FHA.
The Court of ClaIms reversed the lower court decIsIon whICh
called for the counsel to withdraw and rejected the mechamstIc
ImputatIon of confidentIal mformatIon. The court was satIsfied with
the screenmg procedures that had been mstituted, and would not
86. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL
OPINION, No. 342, at 3 (1975). The ethical questions concernmg the former govern
ment attorney m pnvate practice have received diverse solutions. See generally
Note, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. 1025
(1977); Note, Busmess as Usual: The Former Government Attorney and ABA DisCl
plinary Rule 5-105(D), 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1537 (1977); Note, Disqualificatwn of Law

Firm Under DRS-lOS(D) Unnecessary Where Partner Who Had Formerly Been
Government Attorney Was Effectively Screened From Particlpation, 12 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV 189 (1978); Comment, The Disqualif'tcation Dilemma: DR5-105(D) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, 56 NEB. L. REv 692 (1977); Comment, Attor
neys: Legal and Professional Ethtcs: Private Practice and the Former Government
Lawyer 30 OKLA. L. REv 365 (1977).
87. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL
OPINION, No. 342, at 5 (1975).
88. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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disqualify the firm as long as the screenmg procedures were mam
tamed. 89
The mechamstIc ImputatIon approach was agam rejected m
City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electnc Illummatmg Co 90 In that
case, the court recogmzed that the mechamstIc ImputatIon of confi
dences mIght severely restnct the pnvate attorney s future career
and the operatIon of the firm, as well as mterfere with the mdivId
ual's nght to legal counsel of hIs chOIce. 91 The court also adopted
the doctnne of vertIcal responsibility whIch allows that absent di
rect proof to the contrary confidentIal mformatIon relatmg to mat
ters withm the exclUSIve control of another department or sectIon
of a firm, would not be Imputed to the attorney 92 A reVIew of the
other declSlons and ratIonale applied m thIs area led the court to
conclude that the Silver Chrysler treatment was the more mtellec
tually sound method of evaluatmg the disqualificatIon where confi
dentIal mformatIon IS concerned.
V

ANAL YSIS OF THE WESTINGHOUSE CASE

The Seventh Circuit rejected the modern trend eVIdent m
Silver Chrysler Kesselhaut and City .of Cleveland, and reversed
the lower court's deCISIOn m Westmghouse By reversmg the lower
court,93 the CIrcuit court settled two Issues that are cruCial to the
disqualificatIon questIon. The first mvolves the attorney-client rela
bonship. The relatIonshIp has been treated by some courts under
the prmcipies of agency law 94 Another approach reqUIres only a
89. Mr. Prothro [the attorney] IS to continue to have no connection with the
case, all other attorneys are not to discuss it with him and are to prevent any
case documents from reachmg him, the files are to be kept III locked file
cabmet, the keys controlled by Messrs. Altman and Krug and Issued to other
attorneys, clerks, and secretarIes, only on
need to know basiS.
rd. at 793.
90. 440 F Supp. 193 (N.D. OhIO 1977), afI'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977).
9l. rd. at 21l.
92. rd.
93. By statute, the court of appeals has Junsdiction to review final deCISIOns. 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Orders either granting or denymg motions to disqualify coun
sel are generally held to be final collateral orders. Cohen v. BenefiCial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind. Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976);
(citing International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975)); Fullmer
Harper, 517 F.2d 20 (lOth Cir. 1975); Kroungold
Tnester, 521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.
1975); Draganescu
First Nat'l Bank of Hollywood, 502 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974).
94. See, e.g., BrInkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283, 1286
(10th Cir. 1973); Hensley v. United States, 281 F.2d 605, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Rothman v Wilson, 121 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1941); Balmer
Gagnon, 19 ArIZ.
App. 55,504 P.2d 1278 (1973); Farnham
State Bar, 17 Cal. App. 3d 605, 131 Cal.
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finding by the court of a fiducIary relatIOnshIp between the partIes
to bmd the attorney under the codified EthICal ConSIderatIons
of the legal professIon. The court m Westinghouse overcame the
threshold problem of establishmg an attorney-client relatIonshIp by
reJectmg the agency theory 95 The court relied on the more gen
eral standard of the eXIstence of a fidUCIary duty between the attor
ney and client. Through the utilization of thIS standard, the court
was free to determme whether there had been vIOlatIOns of Canons
4 and 5. The lower court had held that thIS Issue was mapplicable.
The court then exammed the separation of the ChIcago and
Washmgton offices. A complete separation of the two offices, ngor
ously enforced, would negate the actual shanng of pertment mfor
matIon. The court's analYSIS of thIS wall"96 between the two offices
mcluded an m-depth diSCUSSIOn of the breach of that wall97 whIch
had occurred. After a diSCUSSIOn of that mCIdent m whICh mforma
tIon between the two offices may have been shared, the court
stated: "Despite thIS breach of the wall, we do not recogmze the
wall theory as modifymg the presumptIon that actual knowledge of
one or more lawyers m a firm IS Imputed to each member of that
firm. "98 Although the breach diSCUSSIOn appears to add weIght to
the final declSlon, the court relied on the mechamstIc Imputation
doctnne to disqualify the firm without an analYSIS of an actual, sub
stantIve breach of the wall. Although the two offices were sepa
rated and client mformatIon was kept confidentIal, the court felt
that there remamed a real possibility of Improper conduct by the
two offices whICh would be mJunous to the confidences and secrets
of the client. One of the concurnng Judges did believe, however,
that had Kirkland established real msulatIon between all of the law
yers workmg on the two proJects, and theIr respective relevant m
formatIon, the automatIc ImputatIon of knowledge would have been
Rptr. 661 (1976); Pierce
MacNeal MemOrial Hosp. Ass n, 46 III. App. 3d 42, 360
N.E.2d 551 (1977); Pearcy v First Nat'l Bank of Wichita, 167 Kan. 696, 208 P.2d 217
(1949); Henderson v. Cape Trading Co., 316 Mo. 384, 289 S.W 332 (1927); Mahoney
v. Lmder, 14 Or. App. 656, 514 P.2d 901 (1973); C.C. Plumb Mixes, Inc.
Stone,
108 R.I. 175,272 A.2d 152 (1971); Clear View Estates, Inc.
Veitch, 67 Wis. 2d 372,
227 N.W 2d 84 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §1, Comment (1957).
95. The Circuit court stated that it was an abuse of discretion for the distrIct
court to apply narrow fonnal agency approach to detennme the critena for fonna
tion of an attorney-client relationshIp. 580 F.2d at 1318.
96. "Chmese wall" was the court' tennmology for the separation practiced be
tween the two offices. Id. at 1321.
97 See note 23 supra.
98. 580 F.2d at 1321.
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elimmated and the lower court declSlon may have been affiirmed. 99
The court rejected Kirkland's argument that the oil companIes
were aware of Kirkland's representatIon of Westmghouse. The
court distmgUIshed "knowledge of the Westmghouse represen
tatIon from awareness that such representatIon would lead to
Kirkland's mitIatIon of a lawsuit agaInst the oil companIes. The
opmIOn states that it could not be presumed that the oil companIes
were aware that the attorneys m the Washmgton office knew noth
mg about the Westinghouse case bemg handled m Kirkland's
ChIcago office. In additIon, the court stated that Kirkland had a
duty to keep the oil companIes adVIsed of actual or potentIal con
flicts of mterest. 100
As to the applicatIon of Canons 4, 5, and 9 to Kirkland's dual
representatIon, the court did not specify how they functIoned m
the development of the final declSlon. The court reasoned that be
cause the oil companIes reasonably relied on the representatIon
that the firm was actmg m the undiVIded mterest of each company
the Canons applied. 101 The court also stated that the SIze of the
firm had no beanng on the applicatIon of the Canons,102 and that
Westmghouse had the optIon of dismIssmg Gulf, Kerr-McGee, and
Getty or dischargmg Kirkland from the case. 103
The court's mechanIstIc ImputatIon of confidences and secrets
to all members of a firm IS logICal only m light of the doctrme s
early histoncal development, or a reading of Canon 9 as a stnct
rule to be followed regardless of the mdividual CIrcumstances or
the actual nsk of Impropnety The two cases most responsible for
the establishment of the ImputatIon doctnne, Consolidated Thea
tres and Laskey Brothers, both mvolved the ImputatIon of mforma
tIon between two partners of a two-member firm.1 04 MechanIstIc
99. [d. n.28 (FaIrchild, J.).
100. The burden of an attorney to aVOid mvolvement m ethical conflicts cannot
be shifted onto the client. Marketti
FitzSimmons, 373 F Supp. 637, 641 (W.D.
Wis. 1974); E.F Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969). See
note 35 supra at 105, 121.
101. 580 F.2d at 1321.
102. [d.
103. [d. at 1322.
104. The value of Consolidated Theatres as precedent may also be challenged.
Although both partners m the firm were disqualified because of the knowledge of
one partner, the other partner continued to represent the plaintiff m that case, the
very party the firm had been disqualified from representing. A review of the court of
appeal' deCISIOn mdicates that the particular POInt was not mentioned. The rationale
for the omiSSIOn may be found In Judge Goddard' unreported opInIOn In the district
court, "[d]efendants conceded before the Master that any question as to the ethical
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ImputatIon appears to be an appropnate rule for the small firm.
The distnct court concluded that the ngid segregatIon between the
two groups of attorneys, the geographICal separatIon of theIr of
fices, and the absence of any hmt of actual disclosure, rendered the
possibility of Improper profeSSIOnal conduct fairly remote. 105 These
CIrcumstances do not comcide with the consIderatIons prevalent
when the rule was created for the small, two-partner firm, makmg
the automatIc ImputatIon rule mappropnate.
The applicatIOn of the ImputatIon doctrme to the large, mul
tIcity firm must be distmgUIshed from the applicatIon of the doc
tnne to the small, two-member firm. The ethICal questIons raised
by thIS distmctIOn must be exammed m light of Canon 9. There are
a number of cases takmg a realistic approach to the applicatIon of
that Canon m the area of disqualification. The reasomng set forth
m Formal OpmIOn 342 106 encourages the pragmatic approach. The
appearance of evil must be exammed m light of the underlymg pol
ICieS for the rule. The Imputation rule was deSIgned to serve sev
eral functions. First, the rule protects the confidences and secrets
of a client from exposure through other members of the firm. Sec
ondly the rule prevents an attorney or firm from bemg mfluenced
by a pnor client or a current client m the exerCIse of hIS profes
sIOnal Judgment. The thIrd reason, developed under the philoso
phy stated by Canon 9, IS to AVOId Even the Appearance of
Impropnety"107 m the actions of the attorney
The goals of the ImputatIOn pnnciple can be met without the
harsh result of disqualification. The presumption of Imputation
should occur when the movmg party proves that he has been, or
IS, mvolved m a profeSSIOnal relationshIp with the attorney or firm,
or that he IS owed a fidUCIary duty and that the subject matter of
the two representations IS suffiCIently related so that mformatIon
from the pnor representation could be pertment to the present liti
gation. The creatIon of a presumption m the movmg party s favor
should be rebuttable by the party charged with the disqualification
by clear and convmcmg eVIdence. 108
duties of Mr. Gold, separate and apart from any partnership with Mr. Nickerson, IS
not Involved In thiS proceeding, and to that view the attorneys for Gold and
Nickerson have subscribed. Laskey Bros. of W Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 130 F
Supp. 514, 519 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
105. 448 F Supp. at 1305.
106. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanymg text.
107 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9.
108. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratonum AJS v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 201
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642 (7th Cir. 1979) (Fairchild, C.J. dissenting); Fred Weber, Inc. v.
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PROPOSALS

One of the major reasons for the mechamshc Imputation of a
client's confidences and secrets IS to aVOid even the appearance of
evil. The chief problem with that standard, as pomted out by the
ABA Committee on EthIcs and ProfessIOnal Responsibility IS that
it IS really no standard at all. What constitutes Impropnety will
vary m the eyes of almost every observer The solutions to thIS
problem must be suffiCIent to assure the reasonable observer that
the poliCieS behmd the rule are bemg safeguarded.
To aVOid disqualificatIOn, the attorney should first contact the
former client whose case poses a conflict with the attorney s pres
ent case, and request that the former client waIve the attorney
client confidentiality 109 The attorney must be aware, however,
that the court will look beyond the agreement to ascertam whether
there IS any latent Impropnety not readily perceptible to the lay
man. 110 If the client IS willing to waIve disqualificatIOn, the conflict
could be aVOided at an early pomt m the representation.
Alternatively a method of determmmg whether the use of m
formation possessed by the attorney mIght be adverse to the
former client would be to have an m camera seSSIOn with the Judge
and attorney 111 Such a heanng would prevent the possibility
of exposmg the mformatIon to the public. The deCISIon could be
rendered early m the representation to aVOid unnecessary delay
Such a hearmg would be, however, of questionable value m a long,
complicated case, because the heanng also would reqUIre an m
vestment of a substantial amount of time by the Judge out of the
courtroom. The already overburdened Judges should not be sub
Jected to these potentially lengthy and mvolved hearmgs. The
hearmg would be most practical m the short, uncomplicated case.
Another approach that has receIved a consIderable amount of
attention IS screenmg. 112 Screemng mvolves taking precautions that
Shell Oil Co., 432 F Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo. 1977), afi'd, 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977),
cen. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Phillips v. Investors Diversified ServICes, Inc., 426
F Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Canadian Gulf Lmes, Inc. v. Triton Int'l Carners, Ltd.,
434 F Supp. 691 (D. Conn. 1976); Baglim v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F Supp. 1060 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), afi'd, 547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1976); FleIscher v. A.A.P Inc., 163 F Supp.
548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismIssed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 359 U.S.
1002 (1959).
109. In re Yarn Processmg Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir.
1976). See also Note, Attorney Conflict of Interest: Representation of Interest Ad
verse to that of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. Rev 61,81 (1975).
1l0. Wise, supra note 47, at 258.
llI. Bncheno v. Thorp, 37 Eng. Rep. 864 (Ch. 1821).
112. See Note, Disqualification-"Screenmg to Rebut the Automatic Law
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would preclude an attorney from bemg accused of vlOlatmg hIs cli
ent's confidentiality Screenmg has application m several areas. The
first of these IS the screemng of the mdivldual lawyer from those
workmg on a related case. ThIS procedure has been used m cases
mvolvmg former government attorneys. The screemng procedures
also should prevent that attorney from rece1Vmg a share of the le
gal fees generated by the representatIon. 113 Screemg should m
clude phYSIcal separation from eVIdence, other work on the case,
and SOCIal mvolvement m discusslOns pertammg to the case.
VertIcal separatIon, an approach prevlOusly discussed,114 IS a
test whICh scrutImzes the actual functionmg of a large firm and cre
ates a presumption that mformatIon pertammg to a partIcular case
IS Imputed only to the members of the section workmg on the
case. In conjunction with thIS approach, large firms mIght find it
advantageous to mform a client that while he will have available
to hlm the full resources of the firm, mformatIon about the case
or representation will be limited only to those workmg directly on
it. In the mstant case, notification to API and the oil compames
about the Westinghouse representation, with full disclosure of the
screemng procedures, would have forced a declslOn as to whether
counsel would be retamed, early m the representation, and thus
saved conslderable delay
A final conslderatIon would reqUIre the attorney to examme
the role he has played m the representation. Members of the firm
may be reqUIred to submit affidavits to the court evaluatmg theIr
nomnvolvement or exposure to the case m question. Through thlS
method, the client may be assured that the attorney has made hIS
declaration fully aware of the possible penaltIes for mlsstatement.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The mechanlstIc lmputatIon of a client's confidences and se
crets IS a Judiclally created deVIce deslgned to prOVIde a better and
more confidential servlce to clients by theIr attorneys. Such a rule
IS logIcal when dealing with the small law firm. ThIS pnnclple lS
not, however necessary to protect the client's mterests m every
Firm Disqualification Rule, 82 DICK. L. REV 625 (1978); Note, Disqualification of
Law Firm Under DR5-105(D) Unnecessary Where Partner Who Had Formerly Been
Government Attorney Was Effectively Screened From PartiCIpation, 12 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv 189 (1978).
113. 555 F.2d at 793.
114. See text accompanymg note 92 supra.
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case. It must be expanded or modified if it IS to be appropnate for
large multIcity firms.
A motIon to disqualify counsel may prolong the penod prIor to
JudicIal declSlon on the merits of the case. 115 ThIS added delay
could exacerbate the problems caused by the heavy case load that
most courts already confront. ConsIderatIon also must be gIven to
the hardshIp and expense that the mnocent client will mcur if he IS
forced to retaIn a new lawyer
AutomatIc disqualificatIon of an entIre firm mterferes with an
mdivldual's access to the counsel of hIS chOIce. The client must
have the rIght to secure the best representatIon available. The law
must also accommodate the young attorney and the government at
torney whose careers would be substantIally limited if they were
charged with all of the confidences and secrets reposed m theIr
past employers and all of the mformatIon Imputed to all members
of theIr present firm. The rule must account for the growth of the
large, departmentalized firms where ImputatIOn IS an ImpractIcal
and unrealistIc rule. In light of available alternatIves to assure
confidentIality the needs of the public and the Amencan Bar Asso
CIatIon s reputatIon can best be served by a rule deSIgned to con
SIder all relevant factors and to grant disqualificatIon only when
there IS an actual possibility of disservIce to the client.

joseph john Kempf jr
115. A number of courts have also recognized the use of disqualification In
some cases as
purely strategic tool. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United
States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Allegaert
v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977); Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc.
v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Woods v. Covmgton County Bank, 537
F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); W.T. Grant Co. v. Hames, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976);
International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1289 (2d Cir. 1975); Lefrak v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1975); Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518
F.2d 311, 315-16 (10th Cir. 1975).

